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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-THE NEED FOR
IMPROVED LEGISLATIVE RECORDS IN MISSOURI
A page of history is worth a volume of logic'
I. INTRODUMtION

2

Because of the growing volume8 and complexity of modem day legislation, attorneys and courts engage more frequently than ever before in
the process of statutory interpretation. The purpose of this comment is to
analyze the desirability and feasibility of producing legislative committee
reports and reporting committee hearings and floor debates of the Missouri General Assembly to aid the courts and attorneys in the interpretation
of statutes. This comment will examine (1) the Missouri courts' use of
legislative aids in statutory interpretation, (2) the reasons for improving
the present system of legislative record keeping, and (3) the various
methods of record keeping that the Missouri legislature might adopt.
II. THE USE OF LEGisLATIvE REcoRDs IN MIssouI
A. DeterminingLegislative Intent and the Plain Meaning Rule
Missouri courts follow the universally accepted principle 4 that the
primary purpose of all statutory interpretation is to determine and effectuate the legislative intent behind the statute.5 In fact, the court has
a duty to limit itself to this purpose;6 all other judicial principles of interpretation are subordinate. 7 Although the Missouri courts always apply
this basic principle in statutory interpretation cases, scholarly debate
continues as to whether legislative intent can be ascertained. 8 Some scholars
take the view that no collective legislative intent exists. 9 Others argue that
legislative intent can definitely be determined.' 0 To believe otherwise is
to deny any relationship between what the legislators do as a body in
enacting a bill and the language of the statute finally adopted." The
1. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (opinion by

Holmes, J.).

2. The author would like to extend his appreciation to the state legislators
and legislative employees not cited whose information and assistance helped make
this comment possible.
3. In 1971 alone, Missouri's General Assembly enacted 247 bills into law during its regular session from January 6 to June 30. CouNcIL oF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
Boor oF rHm STATES 75 (1972-73).
4. Note, Trends in the Use of Extrinsic Aids in Statutory Interpretation, 3
VAND. L. Rxv. 586 (1950).
5. See, e.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Kuehle, 482 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Mo. 1972);
Flarsheim v. Twenty Five Thirty Two Broadway Corp., 432 S.W.2d 245, 251 (Mo.
1968); Collier v. Roth, 468 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Spr. Mo. App. 1971).
6. State v. Brady, 472 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Mo. 1971).
7. State ex rel. Schwab v. Riley, 417 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
8. For an excellent discussion of the continuing battle as to whether legislative intent can be ascertained, see MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754
(1966).
9. Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HAzv. L. Rzv. 863, 870 (1930).
10. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation;"43 HARV. L. Rrv. 886, 888-

89 (1930).
11. De Sloov~re, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U.
L. R.Ev. 527, 538 (1940).
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best view is that legislative intent exists in the general policy behind the
statute and that it can be determined by examining the conditions or
12
evils that the statute is supposed to eliminate.

In their efforts to effectuate this legislative intent, the courts often
use the plain meaning rule. 3 This rule is that when a statute is unambiguous on its face, it must be given effect as written, with the
language taking its plain and ordinary meaning.1 4 It is contended that
the plain meaning rule rests upon precarious grounds: (1) It rests upon
the erroneous assumption that all words in the statute have a fixed and
clear meaning and will always accurately reflect the intent of the legislature if used in their ordinary sense;' 5 (2) it also assumes both that the
legislators anticipate all situations that will arise and that they can
always secure approval by a majority without intentionally including
vague, general terms in the statute. 16
In any event, the effect of the rule is to preclude the courts from investigating the extraneous matters and circumstances surrounding the
statute's passage. 17 The virtual impossibility of determining when the
courts will find the statute's language ambiguous' 8 makes it difficult to
predict when they will resort to legislative records. 19
B. Use of Legislative Records
Regardless of the uncertain application of the plain meaning rule,
when the Missouri courts find the statute ambiguous, they will resort to
20
Of
extraneous materials to determine the intent of the lawmakers.
12. This view was probably best stated by Lord Coke in Heydon's Case, 76
Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584):
[For the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they
penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law,) four things
are to be discerned and considered:
Ist. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law
did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to
cure the disease of the commonwealth.
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy. And then the office of all
Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief
and advance the remedy and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions
for continuance of the mischief ... and to add force and life to the cure
and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act....
Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
See also Note, The Use of Contemporaneous Circumstances and Legislative History in the Interpretationof Statutes in Missouri, 1952 WAsH. U.L.Q. 265, 266.
13. See, e.g., State v. Brady, 472 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Mo. 1971); State v. Moore,
408 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Mo. En Banc 1966).
14. City of St. Louis v. Crowe, 376 S.W.2d 185, 189-90 (Mo. 1964). See also
Julian v. Mayor, 391 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Mo. 1965).
15. Comment, A Re-evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in the Federal Courts, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 125, 134 (1952).
16. Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation,3 KAN'.
L. Rv.1, 20 (1954).

17. Note, supra note 12, at 267.
18. Id. at 268.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Mashak v. Poelker, 367 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Mo. En Banc 1963);
Millspaugh v. Kesterson, 307 Mo. 185, 193, 270 S.W. 110, 112 (En Banc 1925).
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primary concern here is the extent to which the courts would resort to

legislative records if they were available. Several factors indicate the approach the courts would take. First, in most cases where a provision of
the Missouri Constitution is in question, the courts have been willing to
turn to records of the constitutional debates to determine the purpose
and scope of the provision involved. 21 The court's statement in Preisler
v. Hayden22 demonstrates the weight given these records as a reflection of
the drafters' intent:
The Debates of the Constitutional Convention, which it is proper
to consult (as plaintiff contends) in determining the meaning of
Constitutional provisions... clearly show... the purpose of this
Section ....

23

In Stemmler v. Einstein,24 the court stated that "[t]he debates of the 1944
Constitutional Convention lend much color to our conclusions
. "25
Another indication that the courts will use legislative records appears in American National Insurance Co. v. Keitel.26 In that case, the
provision of Missouri's Unemployment Compensation Act 27 that the court
was interpreting contained the same language as a provision of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act.28 Because Missouri had adopted the same
language and lacked its own legislative records, the Missouri Supreme
Court turned to the congressional records to find the federal legislative
intent.2 9 The court presumed that the Missouri legislature knew of the
interpretation placed on the statute during debates in the Senate80 and
found the comments made in those debates conclusive as to the legislative
intent behind the statute.81
The most recent indication appeared in Bullington v. State.82 The
court there relied on the meager legislative records available:
While the statutes themselves constitute the principal evidence
from which the intent of the legislature must be discerned, we
may consider the official Journals of the House and Senate as
indicia of legislative intent where, as here, two laws exist and
ambiguity arises from the fact of their concurrent existence.88
21. See Preisler v. Hayden, 309 S.W.2d 645, 646 (Mo. 1958); Stemmler v.
Einstein, 297 S.W.2d 467, 475 (Mo. En Banc 1956); State ex rel. Donnell v. Os.
burn, 347 Mo. 469, 479-80, 147 8.W.2d 1065, 1068 (En Banc 1941); State ex rel.
Heimberger v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 268 Mo. 598, 616, 188 S.W. 128,
182 (En Banc 1916).
22. 309 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1958).
23. Id. at 646.
24. 297 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. En Banc 1956).
25. Id. at 475.

26. 353 Mo. 1107, 186 S.W.2d 447 (1945).
27. Mo. Laws 1941, at 582, § 9423 (i) (6) (m).
28. INT. RXV. CODE Of 1939, ch. 666, § 1607 (c) (14), 53 Stat. 1395.
29. 353 Mo. at 1111, 186 S.W.2d at 448.
30. Id. at 1111-12, 186 S.W.2d at 448.
31. Id.at 1114, 186 S.W.2d at 450.
32. 459 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1970).
33. Id. at 338.
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III. IMPETus FoR ImPRovEME
Despite the Missouri courts' willingness to follow the lead of the
federal courts 4 in resorting to legislative records, these records are virtually
non-existent in Missouri. 3 5 The legislature does not report its floor debates,
committee hearings or any type of substantive committee reports.3 6 The
only records currently available are the official legislative Journals3 7 and
a few reports on certain bills before the Assembly.3 8 The journals are of
little value, because the data they contain relates only to the report of
the bill out of committee (as "do pass" or "do not pass"), the reading of
the bill, and the final vote on the bill.39 With the exception of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, no committee records its committee hearings. 40
Because this lack of legislative records exists generally, an estimated 99
percent of all cases dealing with statutory interpretation are decided
without the aid of any legislative records. 41
The important question, then, is what is the effect of this lack of
adequate records? This might best be illustrated by an example. In two
different cases, the Missouri Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court inquired into the legislative intent behind similar state and federal
statutes. The intent behind the Missouri statute was important in State
v. Carolene Product 4 2 because there was conflicting language within it.
With no legislative records available, the Missouri court relied solely upon
the language of the statute and the following two maxims of construction:
(1) "[W]here there is irrevocable conflict between two different parts of
the same act, as a rule the last in order of position will control .... ,43;
(2) "where there is one statute dealing with a subject in general and comprehensive terms and another dealing with a part of the same subject in
a more minute and definite way, ...
the special will prevail over the
general

.... 144

34. See Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IowA L. REv. 737
(1940); Comment, Some Comments Concerning the Use of Legislative Debates
and Committee Reports in Statutory Interpretation, 2 BROOI.LYN L. REy. 173
(1933); See Annot., 70 A.L.R. 5 (1931), for lists of federal cases using committee
reports, committee hearings and floor debates in statutory interpretation; Comment,
A Re-evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in the Federal Courts, 52 CoLum.
L. REv. 125 (1952); Comment, A Decade of Legislative History in the Supreme
Court; 1950-1959, 49 VA. L. REv.1408 (1960).
35. Interview with William R. Nelson, Director of Research, Committee on
Legislative Research, Missouri General Assembly, in Jefferson City, Missouri, Sept.
5, 1972. This situation is not unique-some 15 other states fail to keep any records. CouNcm OF STATE GovERNMaus, BooK oF Tm STATES 70-72 (1970-71).
86. Interview with William R. Nelson, supra note 35.
37. Note, supra note 12, at 273.
38. See Mssouxu DEPARTmET oF CommnuNrrY AFFAIws, MISSouRi STATE GovERNmENTAL SERvicEs CATALOG 336 (1970), for a list of available reports.
39. Note, supra note 12, at 273.
40. Interview with William R. Nelson, supra note 35.
41. Horack, Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation, 3
VAND. L. REV. 382, 387 (1950).
42. 346 Mo. 1049, 144 S.W.2d 153 (En Banc 1940).
43. Id. at 1059, 144 S.W.2d at 156.
44. Id., quoting State ex rel. Buchanan County v. Fulks, 296 Mo. 614, 626,
247 S.W. 129, 132 (1922).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/10

4

Woody: Woody: Statutory Interpretation
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 388

At the federal level, the examination of legislative intent arose as a

collateral issue in United States v. Garolene Products.45 The Court gleaned

the intent of the Congress from legislative records, relying on committee
Agriculture and the Senate Comreports of the House Committee on
46
mittee on Agriculture and Forestry.
The Missouri court resolved the ambiguity of the statute strictly by
intuition, with no knowledge of the setting of the statute within the legislative process. 47 Clearly, that approach affords little guarantee that legislative policy will be carried out.48 To the contrary, the legislature probably
did not intend to give effect only to the last part of the statute, and only
to the particular parts as opposed to the general parts. Had this been the
intent, the legislature would not have included the earlier, general parts.
Although judicial maxims of interpretation no doubt have merit, 49
the best indicators of the legislature's intent are the explanations given
by the legislators themselves. That a court has weighed these explanations in the interpretative process makes it more likely that the statute as
interpreted will carry out the policy of the legislature. 0
The fact that only 9 percent of all cases before the Missouri courts
in 1971 involved statutory interpretation 1 does not diminish the advantages of making legislative records available. Although the percentage
may be low, these cases may be the most crucial in terms of policy5 2 In
addition, this percentage does not reflect the practicing attorney's increasing need to be able to interpret statutes in order to fulfill his advisory
responsibilities. 3 Finally, the percentage does not reflect the instances
when the lower court's determination of legislative intent was not challenged at the appellate level.
IV.

PROPOSED IMPROVENMNTS

In light of the foregoing analysis, it is submitted that the extent and
scope of Missouri's legislative records should be expanded. Legislative
recordkeeping and reporting that would aid the courts and attorneys in
statutory interpretation include House and Senate floor debates, committee hearings, and substantive committee reports.

45. 304 U.S. 4 (1937).
46. Id. at 149.
47. See Comment, Legislative Materials to Aid in Statutory Interpretation,
50 HAav. L. REv. 822 (1937).
48. Horack, supra note 41, at 387.
49. But see Horack, supra note 41, at 387; Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory
of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950).
50. See De Sloov&e, supra note 11, at 528, 532; Johnstone, supra note 16, at
17.

51. Sixty-five out of seven hundred and thirteen cases considered involved the

interpretation of statutes.

52. Washy, Legislative Material as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation: a
Caveat, 12 J. PuB. L. 262, 263 (1963).
53. See Johnstone, The Use of Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Construction in
Oregon, 29 Oam. L. Rrv. 1 (1949); MacDonald, The Position of Statutory Construction in PresentDay Law Practice,3 VAIND. L. REv. 369 (1950).
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A journal reporting floor debates verbatim would contain explanations of a bill's purpose by the chairman of the committee reporting it
out as well as the debate, including any corrective amendments made.6 4
Most states that have verbatim reporting of floor debates 55 either publish
the transcripts of the debates in journals or store the information in
computers. New Hampshire has adopted the most economical approach,
providing for verbatim reporting of debate in only one house, the
senate.56 The cost of instituting a procedure of recording and reporting
floor debates of both houses of the Missouri General Assembly in a printed
journal would be approximately $12,500.57 The cost might be considerably
less if the computerized journal method were used.5 8
There are certain limitations upon the usefulness of floor debates in
the process of interpretation. Because only a few legislators may be on the
floor listening to a speech for or against a bill, the record of debate may
contain certain material that was not considered by many of the legislators who supported the bill.59 Also, if the members of the legislature
may amend their remarks before they appear in print, as is permitted
at the federal level, what purports to be a verbatim account of the proceedings will not be completely accurate as to what the General Assembly
really considered. 60 Furthermore, the supporters of a bill may omit much
relevant material from the record in the hope that the bill will attract
more votes if it remains unexplained. 61 In addition, items may be kept
from the record in order to push the burden of interpretation on the
courts so that the legislators will not receive blame for an unpopular
position.62 Another problem, which has arisen in the Congress, results
from members of committees working into the record statements of a
minority intention in hopes of thereby influencing the interpretation of
63
the statute.
However, these problems should be considered by the courts and
attorneys only in deciding the weight to be given the debates. Even in view
of these problems, the debates still furnish a vast amount of invaluable
54. Chamberlain, The Courts and Committee Reports, 1 U. Cm. L. Rrv. 81,
82 (1933).
55. The following states keep verbatim records of all proceedings: Connecticut, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and
West Virginia. Some states keep verbatim records of selected proceedings: Hawaii,
Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Washington. COUNCIL oF STATE GovERNmENTs, supra note 35, at 70-72.
56. CoUNCIL or STATE GovERNSENTs, supra note 85, at 71.
57. This cost estimate is based on figures quoted in a letter from David B.
Ogle, Executive Director, Connecticut Joint Committee On Legislative Management,
to the author, Aug. 30, 1972.
58. See Caldwell, Legislative Record Keeping in a Computer Journal, 5 Hitv.
J. LEGis. 1 (1967).
59. Wasby, supra note 52, at 263-64.
60. Id. at 264.
61. Id. at 266.
62. Id. at 266-67.
63. Payne, The Intention of the Legislature in the Interpretation of Statutes,
9 CURRENT LEG. PROB. 96, 103 (1956).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/10
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information as to the conditions intended to be remedied by the statute.04
Just as important, debates will often reveal problems the bill was not
intended to remedy. 65 In addition, where a bill is passed unchanged after
the committe chairman explains in debate the meaning of the bill, it is
fair to assume that his reported comment reflects the true intent of the
legislature. 66 Finally, reported debates, which are open to study and evaluation, will serve a non-legal function of keeping legislative discussion responsible and67will discourage the use of false evidence to support a
point of view.
B. Committee Hearings

Those states that keep records of their committee hearings 68 transcribe
the debates and then either place copies on file in the state libraryG9 or
store the information on computers. 70 In Missouri, this procedure would
cost approximately $25,000 per year.7 1 The cost would be less if transcripts
of the hearings of only the more active and important committees were
kept.7 2 In most states that keep these records, one not employed 78by the
state must pay the costs of having these records furnished to him.
Records of committee hearings are of limited value in statutory interpretation. The statements by proponents and opponents of a bill do not
necessarily reflect the legislative intent, and they will usually support a
variety of results in a given case.7 4 However, the hearings provide the
benefit of showing the circumstances under which the statute was passed.75
C. Committee Reports

One of the simplest and least expensive methods of providing adequate committee reports for use in interpretation is used in Hawaii, the
only state that requires substantive reports from its committees. An
Hawaiian committee report contains statements of the number and full
64. Horack, The Disintegrationof Statutory Construction, 24

341 (1949).

IND.

L.J. 335,

65. Chamberlain, supra note 54, at 82.

66. MacDonald, supra note 58, at 375-76.
67. W. KEE & M. OGuL, THE AimucAN
Tim

LEGistAnvE PRocEss: CONGRS ANlD

STATEs 272 (2d ed. 1968).

68. The following states keep verbatim records of all committee hearings: Connecticut, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Texas, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Some states keep verbatim records of selected proceedings: Alaska,
Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, South
Carolina, and South Dakota. Couxcm or STATE GovEmNmENTS, supra note 35, at

70-72.
69. Letter from David B. Ogle to the author, supra note 57; letter from
Robert E. Johnson, Executive Director, Texas Legislative Council, to the author,
Aug. 28, 1972; letter from Vincent D. Brown, Clerk of the Legislature, State of
Nebraska, to the author, Aug. 25, 1972.
70. See Caldwell, supra note 58.
71. This cost estimate is based on information in a letter from David B. Ogle
to the author, supra note 57. The cost in Missouri might be considerably less, because Connecticut has a larger number of public hearings than most states.
72. Interview with William R. Nelson, supra note 35.
73. Letter from David B. Ogle to the author, supra note 57.
74. Comment, A Re-evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in the Federal
Courts, 52 COLUM. L. Rxv. 125 (1952).
75. Chamberlain, supra note 54, at 87.
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title of the measure, the findings of the committee, the purpose of the
measure, any amendments prepared by the committee, and the committee's
recommendation and the reasons therefor.7 6 The report is the primary
subject of the second and third readings of the bill before the house,
and the motion before the house is for adoption of the report, "thereby
passing the bill." 7 7 The report, usually only three or four pages long,78

bill is reprinted and is included
is reproduced at the time the amended
79
in the weekly bill status report.
A more expensive method is employed in Congress. Customarily, the
Senate or House committee submitting a bill for consideration also submits a committee report, which explains the reason for the statute and
the intended nature and effect of the bill.S Most of the reports are lengthy,
detailing the facts and opinions brought out in the committee's research
and arguments that will be used on the floor.8 ' As a result, the Congressional reports are substantially more expensive to prepare and print than
the typical state report.
The committee report can be attacked as not necessarily reflecting
the majority view of the legislators who pass the bill, because only a
handful of legislators compose the report.82 It is probably the best indicator
of the intent behind the legislation,83 however, because the committee
normally functions as the legislative body's agent and usually has the
best understanding of the bills it examines.8 4 Regardless of the model
used, the process of printing every report of every committee of the Missouri General Assembly would be expensive and wasteful, because the
courts never interpret most laws emanating from the less important
committees.8 5 Therefore, substantive committee reports should be limited
to the more active and important committees.8 6
D. General Considerations

The greatest problem with any system of legislative recordkeeping
is how to minimize expense while maximizing distribution. The costs
incurred by the state can be offset by the income from sales of the records.
However, it is necessary to keep the cost of purchasing the records at a
BUREAu, HA-IAr BI. DRAFTING MANUAL
GoVERNmENTs, LAWMALING IN THE Wrsr:
A StMMARY OF LEGIsLATIvE BILL PAssiNG PRocEDUREs IN THIRTEEN STATES 43 (1967);
STATE OF HAWAII LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, HAWAI CONSTITUTIONAL CONvENTION STunms: Trn LEGISLATURE 52 (1968).

76. HAW-A% LnoisLAv Rzm mNcE
17 (1971). See also 2 COUNCIL OF STATE

1

77. 2 CoUNCrL OF STATE GoVERNMENiTs, supra note 76, at 43.

78. Letter from Seichi Hirai, Clerk of the Senate, Sixth Legislative Session,
State of Hawaii, to the author, Aug. 29, 1972. Information as to the cost of preparing and printing these reports was unavailable.
79. 2 COUNCIL OF STATE GOvERN~MFNTs, supra note 76, at 43.
80. Chamberlain, supra note 54, at 82.
81. W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, supra note 67, at 233.

82. However, the federal courts assume that the House has ratified the work
of its committees. Wasby, supra note 52, at 270.
83. Richardson, Judicial Law Making: Intent of Legislature v. Literal Interpretation,39 Ky. L. REv. 79, 84 (1950).
84. See Wasby, supra note 52, at 270.

85. Interview with William R. Nelson, supra note 35.
86. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/10
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minimum in order to make them economically available to all practicing
attorneys throughout the state. A valid criticism of the legislative materials
produced at the Congressional level is that the materials pertinent to a
given statute are so voluminous that it is difficult to research the statute
thoroughly and so costly that only the attorneys in the capital and the most
87
prosperous firms in the large cities can afford them.
A system designed to overcome both the compilation and cost problems was initiated in New York under the auspices of the Legislative Annual.8 8 A compilation of all pertinent records on the statutes passed by
the New York legislature appears in one compact annual volume.8 0 A
non-profit membership organization purchases the materials from the
state, prepares them for distribution, and issues them at a cost of 18.00
per annual. 90 This approach could be implemented in Missouri through
a similar private organization, through the Missouri Bar Association, or
through an expansion of the services of the Legislative Research Committee, which is already functioning within the bureaucratic framework of
the General Assembly.
Any of the foregoing systems of recording and reporting could be
implemented without additional legislation. The state constitution already
provides that each committee must keep records of its proceedings if
required by the rules of the respective houses.0 1 Further, the constitution
requires that each house publish a journal of its proceedings.02 The
statutes already provide for the binding and printing of the journals98
and for their sale at cost. 94 To implement the needed recordkeeping, the
houses need only alter their procedural rules to require the keeping of
these records.
V.

CONCLUSION

Merely expanding the scope and availability of legislative records
will not solve all of the problems of interpretation of Missouri statutes.
Many problems will persist, and the more active use of legislative records
87. Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court
Says, 34 A.Ba.J. 535, 558 (1948).
88. E. PoLLACK, FuNmDAmTNALs OF LEAL IRsEAwcH 342 (3d ed. 1967); Nutting, The New York State Legislative Annuals, 26 STAr E Gov'T 291 (1953).
89. Nutting, supra note 88, at 291; Letter from Earnest H. Breuer, State Law
Librarian, New York State Library, to the author, Sept. 16, 1972.
90. This information was furnished by the New York Legislative Service,
Inc. Also available is a system of immediate reporting on the progress of bills
introduced in the New York legislature. At an annual cost of $200, this service
provides information on the source of and support for a bill as well as comment
by which legislative intent may be gauged.
91. Mo. CoNsT. art. III, § 22, provides: "Each committee shall keep such
record of its proceedings as is required by rule of the respective houses and this
record and the recorded vote of the members of the committee shall be filed
with all reports on bills."
92. Mo. CONsr. art. Ill, § 26 provides: "Each house shall publish a journal
of its proceedings."
93. § 2.080, RSMo 1969 provides: "One thousand copies of the journals of
the proceedings of each house shall be printed, under the superintendence of
the secretary of state, in book form, to be distributed according to law."
94. See § 2.060, RSMo. 1969.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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will create new problems. The advantages will dearly outweigh the disadvantages, however. The additional expense of making these aids available to practicing attorneys is as justifiable as the expense of printing
the statutes themselves, because under present legal theory, legislative
aids should be as much a part of the interpretation of a statute as the
language of the statute itself.95 Of course, the legislative records must also
be interpreted. Thus, all of the guesswork as to what was intended by the
legislature will not be eliminated.96 Nevertheless, their existence would
enable the courts to make honest attempts to interpret the statutes so
as to accurately reflect the true intent of the legislature enacting the
7
statute.9
DONALD E. WooDY

95. Meyer, Legislative History and Maryland Statutory Construction, 6 MD.L.
REv. 311, 816 (1942).
96. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation,"48 HARv. L. Rrv. 886, 898

(1930).

97 Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/10

10

